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Abstract: Most countries show a residency discount in rents for sitting tenants. In
the wake of strong rent increases and housing shortages, Germany implemented a
reform in 2001 to curtail rent increases. Based on linked housing-tenant data for
Germany, this paper estimates panel OLS and quantile regressions of rents within
tenancies. The results show that rents deflated by the CPI increase strongly from
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1 Introduction
In comparison to other European countries, a fairly large share of the population in
Germany lives in rental housing (Eurostat 2013). At the same time, the large private
rental housing market in Germany shows a higher level of regulation through rent
control and tenant protection against eviction than the OECD average (Johannsson
2011). In contrast to the current situation, Germany was characterized until the
1990s by fairly liberal rent laws (Bo¨rsch-Supan 1994; Hubert 1998).1 In the wake of
housing shortages and strong rent increases in the 1990s, there was a change towards
more regulation in order to protect sitting tenants. There are less restrictions on
rent increases for new leases and these restrictions remained basically unchanged
during the 1990s and 2000s.
The rental housing market in most countries shows a residency discount for sitting
tenants. With stronger rent control for sitting tenants and tenant protection against
eviction, one would expect a stronger residency discount for sitting tenants if rents
for new leases can adjust to market conditions (Bo¨rsch-Supan 1994; Hubert 1995,
1998). Thus, rent control is likely to protect sitting tenants more than tenants
in new leases. This paper analyzes the impact of the Tenancy Law Reform Act
implemented in 2001 on both the level of rents and the residency discount. Based on
linked housing-tenant data from 1984 to 2011, we estimate panel OLS and quantile
regressions of rents within tenancies.
As an application of hedonic price models (Court 1939, Rosen 1974), a large body of
empirical research examines the relationship between characteristics of rental units
and average rents (see e.g. Barnett 1979, Follain and Malpezzi 1980, Guasch and
Marshal 1987 for the U.S. or Hoffmann and Kurz 2002 or Bischoff and Maennig
2011 for Germany). Rents are regressed on characteristics of rental units and the
coefficients are interpreted as the marginal prices for these characteristics. In an
unregulated rental market, the price effects reflect market conditions which are the
result of supply and demand. In a regulated market, which is the case in our paper,
the estimated price effects are also affected by the institutional constraints. Fur-
thermore, not all price relevant characteristics are observed in rent data and the
1Currently (in 2015), the regulation of the private rental housing market in Germany is further
strengthened through stronger rent control (’Mietpreisbremse’) both for new leases and for sitting
tenants and through the requirement that the person, who engages a real estate agent to find a
tenant/an apartment, has to pay for the service her-/himself. Thus, landlords cannot add the
service fee for an agent they engaged to the rents the tenants have to pay.
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distribution of unobserved characteristics may change with observed characteristics.
Thus, observed characteristics may have different implicit prices along the rent dis-
tribution. The latter aspects motivate the estimation of quantile regressions which
go beyond the estimation of the effects on average rents.
Hedonic price regressions are often augmented by covariates which are not per se
characteristics of the rental units and which may reflect frictions in the rental market.
Regulations such as rent control and tenant protection against eviction have an
impact on rents and the effects may differ by the level of rents. For instance, one
would expect that rent control should reduce the rents for expensive apartments
more strongly than for cheap apartments. Similarly, rent control for sitting tenants
should increase the length of residency discount, i.e. the reduction in rents as elapsed
tenure of the tenant grows, when rents for new leases are less regulated (as it is the
case in Germany). This effect may be strongest for expensive rental units, which
further motivates the estimation of quantile regressions for rents.
The rent control and the protection of tenants against eviction were strengthened in
light of the rent increases observed in West Germany during the 1990s. The Tenancy
Law Reform Act, implemented since September 1, 2001, covers all tenancies starting
on this date or later. Its most substantial changes involve a cap on the maximum
rent increases by landlords for sitting tenants and a reduction of the minimum notice
time until termination of a tenancy by the tenant to three months, while keeping the
protection of the tenant against eviction unchanged. Before the reform, landlords
could increase rents by 30% within three years. After the reform, the maximum is
reduced to 20%.2 Our empirical analysis investigates the impact of the reform on
rents. Specifically, we investigate the observed change in the length of residency
discount because the reform did not change regulations of the rents for new leases.
Our empirical analysis uses linked housing-tenant data from the German Socio-
Economic Panel (SOEP) for the time period 1984 to 2011. These data offer the
unique advantage of a large and representative panel data set of tenancies. The
panel structure allows us to control for unobservable time-invariant characteristics of
a tenancy. We restrict the analysis to West German households and to observations
with elapsed tenure up to 10 years.
2The actual upper limit of rent increases, however, was and still is given by the average local
rent index (published by local authorities) reflecting the average rent of comparable rental units in
the neighborhood (’ortsu¨bliche Vergleichsmiete’). A higher rent increase is possible to compensate
for the costs of modernizing the rental unit or for an increase in the running costs.
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Our empirical results show that rents deflated by the CPI increase strongly from 1984
until the reform in 2001, and there is a reversal in the trend afterwards. Before the
reform, we find a significant residence discount in the rent level which decreases in
absolute value with tenure and which is stronger at the top than at the bottom of the
rent distribution. The reform reduces rents, in particular for expensive apartments
and for new leases. The reform eliminates the residency discount and the fixed effects
estimates reveal that after the reform rents in fact grow with tenure, especially for
more expensive apartments. The evidence is consistent with expensive tenancies
being likely to end earlier and tenants in new leases benefitting strongly from a
reduction in rents induced by the reform. Our evidence suggests that the reform was
successful in curtailing rent increases for new leases and for expensive apartments
early in a tenancy.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the back-
ground of the analysis and reviews the existing literature. Section 3 describes the
data used. Section 4 introduces the econometric approach. Section 5 provides de-
scriptive statistics and discusses the regression results. The final section involves our
concluding remarks. An additional online appendix contains all the results, which
in this paper are referred to as being available upon request.3
2 Background
We first discuss economic and institutional aspects of rental housing in Germany.
Then, we provide a selective literature review and develop some hypotheses as the
basis of our empirical analysis.
2.1 Private Rental Housing in Germany
Evidence provided by Eurostat (2013)4 shows that in 2013 about 47% of the German
population live in rental housing, which is a high share in international comparison.
Only in Switzerland, this share is even higher while especially in Eastern and South-
ern Europe owner-occupied housing is much more common. The causes for this
difference are manifold. Differences in attitudes towards home-ownership may play
a role. While in Germany home ownership is rather viewed as a long-term invest-
3See www.wiwi.hu-berlin.de/de/professuren/quantitativ/oe/research/publications.
4Online data code: ilc lvho02.
3
ment and rental housing seems better suited for temporary housing needs, it is more
common in Anglo-Saxon countries to buy and sell residential houses depending on
the own current economic situation and needs (Bo¨rsch-Supan 1994). In addition
to differences in the flexibility to buy and sell residential houses, preferential tax
treatment may shape housing demand. In contrast to a number of other European
countries, there is no preferential tax treatment of owner-occupied housing in Ger-
many regarding the difference between the after-tax and the pre-tax interest rate
of mortgage loans, which is a likely reason for the high share of rental housing in
Germany (CESifo 2005).5
While Germany is characterized by rather liberal rental laws up to the early 1990s,
a shift takes place since then towards much more “tenant friendly” rental laws (Hu-
bert 1998, Bo¨rsch-Supan 1994). In comparison to other OECD countries, the pri-
vate rented housing sector in Germany is strongly regulated curtailing the flexibility
of landlords. Figures 1 and 2, as taken from Johansson (2011), show that Ger-
many as of 2010 shows a very high level of rent control and an above average level
of tenant protection in international comparison. Despite the tighter regulations,
rents increase strongly during the 1990s in most parts of Germany, especially in
the metropolitan areas. Hubert (1998) views the rising regulation in the 1990s as
a response to an acute housing shortage after German unification in order to avoid
strong rent increases for incumbent tenants. Because rent increases for new leases
are less regulated (Bo¨rsch-Supan 1994), strong rent control for sitting tenants is
complemented by tenant protection against eviction by the landlord motivated by
the goal of increasing the rent (henceforth denoted as economic eviction).
— Insert figure 1 here. —
— Insert figure 2 here. —
As a further policy response to protect tenants, the Tenancy Law Reform Act6 in
2001 reduces the maximum rent increases for sitting tenants from 30% to 20% over
the course of three years. The new cap applies only, if the planned increase in
rents does not exceed the average rent of comparable units in the neighborhood
5The current situation differs strongly from the rather favorable taxation of owner-occupied
housing during the 1970s and 1980s in West Germany, see Hubert (1998) and Bo¨rsch-Supan (2004).
6Gesetz zur Neugliederung, Vereinfachung und Reform des Mietrechts (Mietrechtsreform), see
Bundestag (2000) for a discussion of the objectives of the reform.
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(ortsu¨bliche Vergleichsmiete) as measured by the local rent index excluding rent in-
creases due to modernization or growing running costs included in rents (see §558(3),
§559, and §560 German Civil Code [BGB] for further details). The local rent index
is intended to provide both tenants and landlords an indication of market conditions
and to allow tenants to identify particularly high rents.7 A local rent index typically
provides for comparable apartments the average rent and the interval around the
average, covering the two-third span ranging from the one sixth (17%) quantile to
the five sixth (83%) quantile. The local rent index serves as a monitoring instrument
for rent control in Germany.
Furthermore, the reform involves a reduction of the minimum notice time until ter-
mination of a tenancy by the tenant to three months, while it keeps the protection of
the tenant against eviction by the landlord unchanged. Before the reform, the notice
time depends upon the length of the tenancy, with a minimum of three and a max-
imum of twelve months. The reform initially only applies to tenancies that started
on September 1, 2001 or later. As an extension of the reform in 2005, the notice
time of three months also applies to tenancies which has started before September 1,
2001.8 One objective of our paper is to estimate the statistical association between
the 2001 reform and the length of residency discount over the distribution of rents.
2.2 Literature Review and Hypotheses
There exists a sizeable literature in economics on the effect of rent control on the
rental market. Eekhoff (1981), Bo¨rsch-Supan (1986), and Schwager (1994) provide
a theoretical discussion of the welfare implications of a reform in Germany in 1975,
which strengthens the protection of tenants against economic eviction and which
regulates maximum rent increases for sitting tenants.9 There is stronger rent control
for sitting tenants compared to rent setting for new leases in order to protect sitting
tenants. The predicted welfare effects are ambiguous. On the one hand, there
are negative welfare effects because rent control reduces efficiency and flexibility in
the rental market, thus resulting in deviations from market equilibrium and from
7Based on a sample from the local rental market, the local rent index (Mietspiegel) reports the
average rents and the dispersion of rents for comparable apartments/housing units.
8See Klarstellungsgesetz 2005 and Art. 229 §3 Abs. 10 EGBGB - Einfu¨hrungsgesetz BGB - for
further information.
9“Law for the Protection of Tenants from Arbitrary Eviction” [Zweites Wohnraumku¨ndigungss-
chutzgesetz (2. WKSchG)] The law is a predecessor of the 2001 Tenancy Law Reform Act.
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the law-of-one-price for a good with the same characteristics. It may reduce the
supply of rental units. On the other hand, there could be positive welfare effects if
landlords value the curtailment of their property rights less than tenants value the
benefits of a cap on rent increases in a dynamic perspective (Bo¨rsch-Supan 1994,
Hubert 1995). Furthermore, rent control for sitting tenants is likely to imply a front
loaded rent payment schedule, where landlords would ask for higher rents at the
beginning of a tenancy to compensate for the stronger rent control during tenancy.
This could result in rental payments that decrease with the length of residency for
sitting tenants relative to rents for new leases of comparable apartments. Further
implications of these considerations are that the rent for a given apartment increases
more strongly than the market rents for comparable apartments when a new lease
starts, and therefore landlords have an incentive to evict sitting tenants in order to
realize a rent increase with a new lease. Because of the latter incentive, a stronger
rent control for sitting tenants is typically complemented with a stronger protection
of sitting tenants against economic eviction.
Before reviewing some empirical results on the length of residency discount, let
us discuss some pertinent theoretical aspects in a bit more detail. A large part
of the U.S. literature (e.g. Guasch and Marshall 1987) argues that the length of
residency discount can be explained by the survival of good matches of landlords
and tenants in the presence of turnover costs for both sides. Providing a somewhat
different perspective, Barker (2003) considers the relationship between turnover costs
and the level of price discrimination between new leases and long-term tenancies.
Landlords of apartments with low turnover costs are more likely to raise rents for
sitting tenants. Furthermore, tenants in new leases could obtain a discount because
of a lower demand elasticity of long-term tenants or because of the higher mobility
costs of the latter. Thus, it is an open empirical question as to whether a length of
residency discount exists.
Relating the length of residency discount to regulation, Hubert (1995) discusses a
possible justification for a regulation, which protects tenants against arbitrary evic-
tion, based on efficiency grounds. The argument relies on adverse selection operating
in the presence of asymmetric information about tenants. If tenants differ in the
’service costs’ to be paid for by the landlords and landlords offer rental contracts
with different lengths, then tenants with low service costs would select into shorter
tenancies because they can show after a while that they are good (≡ low service cost)
tenants. Furthermore, longer tenancies would rather involve tenants with high ser-
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vice costs. Increasing tenant protection may overcome an inefficient segmentation
of good (bad) tenants in short-term (long-term) tenancies in market equilibrium.
Hubert (1995) discusses the combination of rent control and tenant protection to
prevent economic eviction. The analysis implies that the length of residency dis-
count increases with the strength of rent control. However, the lower the rent the
stronger is the incentive for economic eviction, possibly using one of the legal routes
(e.g. modernization of apartment). Altogether it is an open empirical question as
to whether tenancies with low rents are more likely to survive because of the higher
interest of tenants to keep a cheap apartment or less likely to survive because of the
higher interest of landlords in economic evictions. Furthermore, rent control may
be binding more for the rent increases for new leases of more expensive apartments.
Thus, it is an open empirical question as to how the length of residency discount
varies across the distribution of rents.
Hoffmann and Kurz (2002) find a length of residency discount for Germany which
could be a kind of compensation for the diminishing quality of an apartment over
time. Schlicht (1983) interprets the discount as a landlord’s concession trying to keep
good tenants, especially when tenants’ preferences change over time and landlords
want to avoid turnover costs, e.g. forgone rents and search costs for new tenants.
The existing empirical literature for the U.S. mostly finds evidence for a length of
residency discount in average real rents for rental housing when regulation is lower
than in Germany, see e.g. Barnett (1979), Bo¨rsch-Supan (1994), Follain and Malpezzi
(1980), Noland (1979), Goodman and Kawai (1985), Basu and Emerson (2000), or
Guasch and Marshall (1987). Guasch and Marshall (1987) decompose the discount
into a pure sit discount and a length of residency discount. While the former discount
is offered by landlords when contracts are renegotiated, the latter discount is given
for each additional year tenants spend in the same rental unit. Using the Annual
Housing Survey (AHS) data from 1974 to 1977, they estimate multiple specifica-
tions and find a sit discount between 6% and 13% and an annual residency discount
between 0.2% and 0.8%.10 Using data of 102 apartment complexes in US-American
metropolitan areas, Barker (2003) finds that discounts for short-term tenants are
more common. Since rental payments rise faster than turnover costs, he predicts
10Guasch and Marshall (1987) also implement a selection correction for the termination of a
tenancy accounting for selection on unobservables. Correcting for selection on unobservables in
our quantile regression estimates is beyond the scope of this paper for two reasons. First, how
to account for selection when estimating quantile regression is still subject of an intensive debate
(Huber and Melly 2012). Second, finding a credible instrument with sufficient bite is difficult.
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that discounts for new leases become more frequent. Sims (2007) analyzes the ef-
fect of rent control in various cities in Massachusetts that ended in 1995. The rent
increase was adjusted to a specific annual rate, condominium conversions was made
harder for landlords to avoid a reduction of the rental stock, and a prohibition
to evict tenants without permission was imposed. Altogether, only 20% of rental
housing was under active control because vacancy decontrol was possible. Based
on difference-in-differences estimates, Sims (2007) finds that rent control leads to
a significant rent decline. Furthermore, tenants’ mobility falls as measured by sig-
nificantly longer tenancies and the stock of rental housing declines because of the
reduced attractiveness of rental apartments as investments for landlords.
Summing up and providing an outlook on our empirical analysis, our reading of the
literature implies that the empirical studies so far have been restricted to an empiri-
cal analysis of how average rents vary by length of residency and other characteristics
of the apartment and the tenant. We provide an analysis of the change in rents for
new leases and of the effect of the length of residency (elapsed tenure) depending
on the level of rents using quantile regression. The theoretical considerations above
suggest that the length of residency discount depends upon tenants’ characteristics
such that tenants with lower mobility costs experience a higher discount. The dis-
count should be larger when rents for new leases show a strong upward trend. It is
an open empirical question as to how the length of residence discount varies with the
level of rents because, on the one hand, tenants are more interested to keep a cheaper
apartment and rent control may be binding more for the rent increases for new leases
of more expensive apartments. On the other hand, landlords of cheaper apartments
have a stronger incentive for economic evictions and there may be a stronger need
for a modernization of the apartment justifying a rent increase. Furthermore, the
above considerations imply that a reform strengthening the protection of sitting
tenants against eviction and against rent increase should increase the length of res-
idency discount. However, it is a priori unclear as to how the increase varies with
the rent level. Because the theoretical considerations suggest that the rent level
and the length of residency discount depend both upon tenants’ characteristics and
characteristics of the apartment, we use a panel of linked housing-tenant data.
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3 Data
The empirical analysis uses the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP), a
representative annual household panel survey.11 Because of a lack of information
on East German rental units before German unification and the ongoing transition
process as well as the strong regulation of rents in East Germany during the 1990s,
our analysis is restricted to West Germany.
The SOEP offers detailed information on rental housing from the perspective of ten-
ants, thus providing linked housing-tenant data.12 Because these are panel data on
tenancies, we can study the length of residency discount within tenancies. The avail-
able variables include the size of an apartment (or house) in square meters (sqm),
its equipment like the existence of a basement, balcony or terrace, and a garden, the
type of building regarding the number of rental units and the year of construction,
information as to whether the apartment is subsidized by the government and as to
whether there is a private or a public landlord. We exclude outliers with a reported
apartment size of less than 20 sqm and of more than 200 sqm as well as observations
with a reported rent of less than 50 Euros (in current prices).
To account for variation in regional housing markets, we account for the state (”Bun-
desland”) and we use detailed information on the location available in the SOEP, such
as city size (number of inhabitants), region, type of residential area, and information
on amenities in the local neighborhood.13 In addition, one observes the length of
residence so far (elapsed tenure ≡ elapsed tenancy duration). Our panel data allow
to control for unobserved time-invariant tenancy-specific characteristics, which can
account for biases induced by the selective termination of tenancies (Guasch and
Marshall 1987). Our dependent variable of interest is the real gross rent actually
paid (without costs for heating) - henceforth referred to as rent. We deflate rents to
2005 prices using the consumer price index.
The final data set consists of 11,328 households and 18,601 tenancies, which means
11We use the version of the data set for the time period 1984-2011, http://dx.doi.org/10.
5684/soep.v28.1 (see Wagner et al. (2007), Wagner et al. (2008) and Schupp (2009) for further
information).
12We coin this term in analogy to linked employer-employee data used in labor market research.
Up to our knowledge, the term linked housing-tenant data (or another term conveying the same
idea) has not been used so far in the literature.
13The information on the amenities is available for the years 1986, 1994, 1999, 2004, and 2009. To
impute the values in between, we assume that within a tenancy the distance to amenities measured
by the time needed by foot to reach the amenity does not change over time.
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that we observe on average 1.6 tenancies per household. To account for the 2001
Tenancy Law Reform Act, we define a dummy variable that indicates whether the
tenancy started on September 1, 2001 or later. To make the samples before and
after the reform comparable, we restrict the panel data set to those observations
with elapsed tenure up to 10 years because we can not observe a longer tenure after
the reform.
4 Econometric Approach
We estimate a standard hedonic price regression which we augment with variables
observed for tenants.14 The estimated coefficients of the apartment characteris-
tics are interpreted as implicit prices, which may be interpreted as the consumer’s
marginal willingness to pay, if he or she is able to choose between a sufficiently large
number of units that vary in their characteristics.
Based on the limited set of characteristics of the apartment observed and because
of likely frictions in the rental housing market, prices for apartments with the same
observed characteristics do vary.15 Consumers may differ in their willingness to
pay and the limited mobility of tenants may prevent relative prices to equal the
willingness to pay for certain characteristics. These issues motivate the estimation
of quantile regressions. In addition, it is likely that the distribution of unobservables,
as measured by the dispersion of prices within cells defined by observed apartment
characteristics, may differ across cells.
4.1 Specification and Identification
We specify the rent for rental unit i in year t by
(1) log(rentit) =
k∑
j=1
βj ·Xj,i,t + f(Tenit)′γ + δ0RDit + [RDitf(Tenit)]′δ1 + µt + εit
14Waugh (1929) and Court (1939) were the first to use this approach. Griliches (1961 and
1971), Lancaster (1966 and 1971), and Rosen (1974) introduced the hedonic price model to a wider
audience of economists.
15Sirmans, Macpherson, and Zietz (2005), Zietz, Zietz, and Sirmans (2007) and Zietz, Sirmans,
and Smersh (2008) address the heterogeneity of implicit prices in housing markets. Decomposing
the unconditional rental price distribution of advertised apartments in Berlin, Thomschke (2015)
finds that the increase in rental prices are due to a changing demand structure regarding quality and
quantity rather than a change in apartment characteristics, especially in the high-price segment.
10
where log(rentit) denotes the log deflated rental payment, Xj,i,t for j = 1, . . . , k
are the apartment characteristics and βj the corresponding implicit price. Tenit is
the elapsed tenure of unit i in year t and our specification will use linear splines in
elapsed tenure. f(Tenit) involves the specific terms of the separate spline segments
and γ and δ1 are the corresponding coefficient vectors, respectively. µt are year fixed
effects. RDit is a reform dummy which is zero for tenancies starting before the 2001
reform and one for tenancies starting after the 2001 reform. εit is the idiosyncratic
error term. For our fixed effects estimates, tenancy specific fixed effects are added
to equation (1).
The identification of the reform effects in equation (1) relies on the differences be-
tween tenancies starting before 2001 and still continuing after 2001 and tenancies
starting after 2001. The reform only applies for those tenancies starting after 2001.
Thus, the year effects starting from 2001 onwards can be separated from the reform
dummy because the reform effect does not apply for tenancies starting before 2001
and continuing at least until 2001. Analogously, we can identify the coefficients
of the reform dummy and its interactions with the linear tenancy splines. For the
OLS fixed effects estimator, the reform dummy cannot be identified. We also do
not include a reform dummy in the panel fixed effects quantile regressions as de-
scribed in the following. However, the coefficients of the interactions of the linear
tenancy splines with the reform dummy are identified because, over time, tenancies
do change from one spline segment to the next.
To identify the nonlinear effect of elapsed tenure on rental payment, we construct
linear splines. After a preliminary cross-validation of models with equally positioned
but varying number of knots, the preferred specification has one knot at three years
of elapsed tenure.
4.2 Quantile Regression
Quantile regressions allow to estimate how the market valuation of characteristics
of apartments varies with the level of rents across the conditional rent distribution
(see Koenker and Hallock 2001 and Koenker 2005 for details). A further advantage
is that quantile regressions are more robust than OLS to outliers in the dependent
variable. Estimating quantile regressions for panel data within a tenancy can reveal
the net effect of rent setting for new leases and sorting effects due to termination
of tenancies if the ranking of rents across tenancies does not change over time. For
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instance, if the length of residency discount is generally higher (lower) at the top
of the rent distribution than at the bottom, then tenancies for cheaper apartments
may be more (less) likely to end early. Furthermore, if the discount between the first
and the second year of a tenancy is higher (lower) at the top of the rent distribution
than at the bottom, then rents for new leases grow more (less) for more expensive
apartments compared to less expensive apartments.
Using the same specification as for OLS, we estimate quantile regressions at the me-
dian, at the 17%- (one sixth) and at the 83%- (five sixth) quantile of the conditional
rent distribution. This way we cover the two-third span of conditional rents as it is
customary for an official local rent index in Germany. For our baseline model, we
also provide quantile regression estimates at each decile to investigate whether the
results at the three quantiles we focus upon are representative for the entire distri-
bution. We obtain clustered standard errors for our estimated coefficients through
bootstrapping based on 200 resamples. We resample entire tenancies to account for
heteroscedasticity and serial correlation of the error term within a tenancy.
As robustness check, we estimate panel regressions accounting for mean tenancy
fixed effects as suggested for quantile regression by Canay (2011).16 We first estimate
the fixed effects OLS regression and obtain the mean tenancy fixed effects. Then,
to implement the quantile regressions with fixed effects, we substract the mean
tenancy fixed effects from the rents within a tenancy and estimate the panel quantile
regressions for these adjusted rents based on an intercept and the time-varying
covariates. Note that the approach does not allow the fixed effects to differ across
quantiles. Accounting for quantile specific fixed effect would result in an estimator
which is not easy to interpret because then the conditional distribution for a given
tenancy modeled by the quantile regression estimates would change by quantile.
In contrast to fixed effects OLS estimation, our fixed effects quantile regression
still suffers from the incidental parameter problem even though the estimated fixed
effect is part of the dependent variable.17 It is likely that our fixed effects quantile
16We prefer this simple estimator compared to more involved alternatives proposed in the litera-
ture. Koenker (2004) was the first to suggest a fixed effects quantile regression by adding a dummy
for each cross-sectional unit and by including an L1-penalization to shrink the individual fixed
effects to zero (see also Koenker 2005, chapter 8.7, and Lamarche 2010). This estimator involves
the choice of a shrinkage (tuning) parameter. Consistency of this estimator requires that both
the number of cross-sectional units and the number of time periods converge to infinity. As an
alternative approach, among others, Galvao and Kato (2015) suggest to estimate the asymptotic
bias of the fixed effects quantile regression without penalization in order to correct for this bias.
17Note that the number of panel observations in our application is unlikely to be large enough to
render the bias in the fixed effects estimator negligible. The average number of panel observations
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regression estimator is smoothed across quantiles, because the estimation error in
the fixed effects may attenuate the differences in coefficients across quantiles.18
5 Empirical Results
5.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 shows means and standard deviations of apartment characteristics for the full
sample as well as for subsamples with tenancies starting before September 1, 2001,
or afterwards [before and after the reform - here and henceforth, after September 1,
2001 also includes tenancies that start on September 1, 2001]. Recall that to make
the samples before and after the reform comparable, the samples are restricted to
those observations with the elapsed tenure up to 10 years. 25% (75%) of the tenancies
are observed to have started after (before) September 1, 2001. The column labeled
“Difference” displays results of t-tests of equality of means for each variable in both
subsamples. The average rent for tenancies starting after the reform is e 461 and
the average rent for tenancies starting before the reform is e 420.
Both subsamples differ significantly in further apartment characteristics. Tenancies
starting after the reform are on average 2.4 sqm larger, can rather be found in more
recently built tenancy-occupied houses (especially in houses built after 1990), and
are on average better equipped (more likely to include a balcony, a terrace or a
garden, and central heating). Mechanically, the elapsed tenure in tenancies starting
after the reform is 1.5 years shorter. Also, the households in the two subsamples
differ slightly in their assessment (assess) of the rental payment and the apartment
size.19
′20 Tenants in the before-reform subsample are 6.5 percentage points (ppoints)
more likely to assess their rent to be inexpensive and they are 1.8 ppoints more likely
per tenancy in our sample (elapsed tenure up to 10 years) is 5.6. The lower quartile is 3 and the
upper quartile is 8. Still, if the fixed effects quantile regression estimates differ from the standard
panel quantile regression estimates, the direction of the change is likely to be informative, especially
if it corresponds to the OLS fixed effects estimator.
18We are extremely grateful to a referee to point this out and to refer us to an unpublished study.
Unfortunately, this study is very preliminary and at this point we are not supposed to provide the
reference.
19The variables displayed in Table 1 under “Further Characteristics” are only used for descriptive
comparisons. They are not part of the specification of the final regressions.
20The differences in assessment we observe are larger when adding observations with tenure
above 10 years to the before-reform sample. The evidence is consistent with a tenancy being more
likely to last if the renter is more satisfied, i.e. better matches are more likely to last. These results
are available upon request. We are grateful to a referee for suggesting this point.
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to assess their apartment to be too small. At the same time, the rent-to-income
ratio increases by 2.7 ppoints for the after-reform sample.21 Overall, the descriptive
evidence suggests that the demand for larger (and better equipped) apartments is
rising over time and households are willing to spend a higher share of their income on
rents. However, the difference could also reflect the remaining difference in elapsed
tenure in combination with better matches being more likely to last.
— Insert Table 1 here. —
Table 2 shows mean differences in some key variables between the first tertile (low-
price segment) and the third tertile (high-price segment) of the unconditional rent
distribution (recall that rents are deflated by the CPI to 2005 prices). Apartments in
the high-price segment are 34 sqm larger than in the low-price segment. High-price
apartments are rather located in recently built houses/buildings, in new residential
areas, in larger cities, and in city centers (evidence on these variables is available
upon request). As to be expected, high-price apartments are on average better
equipped. Furthermore, apartments in the high-price segment are rather located
next to stores, parks, sports complexes or public transport, and the apartment size
per person is larger. Households in the high-price segment tend to assess the rent
as being too high and the size of the apartment as being too large compared to
the assessments in the low-price segment. Consistent with the subjective assess-
ments, there is a 7 ppoints higher rent-to-income ratio in the high-price segment.
The evidence suggests that tenants in the high-price segment demand higher qual-
ity apartments, but they tend to think that their apartments are over-priced and
possibly too well equipped relative to their needs. These findings may rationalize
the political momentum towards stronger rent control in the wake of the large rent
increases during the 1990s.
— Insert Table 2 here. —
5.2 Estimation Results
Table 3 provides the estimation results for our baseline panel OLS and quantile
regressions. We estimate quantile regressions at the median (QR 50%), at the one
21The rent-to-income ratio is calculated as the share of the household net income that is spent
on the gross rent without heating.
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sixth (QR 17%), and at the five sixth (QR 83%) quantile. The column ’83%-17%’
involves t-statistics for the significance of the difference of the coefficients between
QR 83% and QR 17%.22
Quite uniformly, the covariates apartment size, city size, and central location show
the expected positive effects on rents. The differences between the two tail quan-
tiles are mostly not significant, but there are some notable exceptions. The average
partial effect (APE) of apartment size increases between the two quantiles by 4.1
log points, thus implying a higher dispersion of rents for larger apartments. Regard-
ing the type of house, rents for nondetached houses and apartments in multiunit
buildings are ceteris paribus higher than in detached houses. A priori, one would
expect a higher rent for detached houses and our estimates should not be viewed as
being causal. Most likely, detached houses and multiunit buildings differ on average
in some unmeasured characteristics. Furthermore, in multiunit buildings, the rents
are less dispersed than in detached houses (the quantile differences are significantly
negative). It is likely that unobserved characteristics among detached houses are
more dispersed than in more standardized multiunit buildings. Rents are higher
in new residential areas compared to old residential areas, typically in apartments
with more amenities in walking distance, and in better equipped apartments (the
results for the latter three variables are available upon request). Rents are higher
and more dispersed for private landlords and for non-subsidized housing. A housing
subsidy may imply a particular restriction on rent increases for higher rents. Private
landlords, who tend to focus more on higher revenues, are more likely to raise rents
compared to non-private landlords.
— Insert Table 3 here. —
Let us now turn to our estimates of the length of residency discount. We estimate
flexible linear splines and our regressions report the slope (the annual discount) for
each linear segment of our splines. For the first three years of a tenancy, we find
a significant annual reduction of rents which amounts to 1.2 log points per year
and the decline is significantly stronger for higher rents. At the 83% quantile the
22We also estimate unconditional quantile (RIF) regressions (Firpo et al. 2009) to investigate
the effects on the unconditional rent distribution. The reform effect and the length of residency
discounts are quite similar to those estimated by the conditional quantile regressions reported in
this paper. However, the estimated coefficients are in some instances more heterogeneous across
quantiles. The results for the RIF regressions are available upon request. Because the level of rents
changes strongly over time, our study focuses on conditional quantile regression estimates.
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annual discount amounts to 1.7 log points while at the 17% quantile the annual
discount is only 0.7 log points. From the fourth year of a tenancy onwards, the
residency discounts become more uniform. While at the 17% quantile the annual
discount increases slightly to 0.8 log point, it falls to 0.9 log points at the 83%
quantile. Figure 3 provides the estimated annual discounts at each decile confirming
that the results at the three quantiles reported in the table are representative for
the entire distribution. We find that the dispersion of rents falls during the first
years of a tenancy while there is no evidence for a significant further reduction of
the dispersion after the fourth year.
The baseline rent regressions control for year dummies, states, and the year of con-
struction (the corresponding coefficients and further details are available upon re-
quest). As to be expected, rents increase with the year of construction and the
increase is significantly stronger at the bottom of the rent distribution compared to
the top. There are also significant differences in rents across states.
Next we turn to the time effects and the reform effects. The estimated time effects
reflect a uniform growth of average and median rents (deflated by the CPI) between
1984 and 2001 by 26 log points. The increase is significantly higher by about seven
log points at the 17% quantile compared to the 83% quantile. The stronger increase
at the bottom of the distribution may rationalize the strong political demands for
further rent control in the 1990s and 2000s. Incidentally, rents do not increase
further after 2001 and rents at the 17% quantile (83% quantile) are six (two) log
points lower in 2011 compared to 2001. Apparently, rent growth has stopped after
2001 but it has to be kept in mind that the regression also includes a dummy
variable ’After Reform’ which corresponds to tenancies starting after the reform in
2001. The OLS reform effect is minus four log points and the decline is about three
log points stronger at the top of the distribution compared to the bottom. Figure
4 shows that the estimates by decile confirm a uniformly growing reform effect (in
absolute value) along the distribution. These findings suggest a stronger effect of
the reform in curtailing higher rents. However, the difference between the two tail
quantiles is not significant. Altogether we find a general decline in rents after 2001
and a further decline of rents for new tenancies after the reform. While the general
decline is stronger for lower rents, the specific (partial) reform effect is stronger for
higher rents. Prima facie, our findings suggest that in times of generally falling
rents the reform did in fact result both in reducing rent growth for new leases,
especially for expensive new leases. The latter implies that households living in
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expensive apartments tend to benefit more from the reform than households living
in cheaper apartments. Thus, one may be concerned that the reform may not have
been sufficiently targeted, if the goal was to curtail rents for low-income tenants who
tend to pay lower rents.
Now, we investigate the impact of the reform on the residency discount. One could
expect that the reform increases the discount, and the reduction should be particu-
larly strong for higher rents. We keep the reform dummy and we add interactions of
the reform dummy with the splines in elapsed tenure. Table 4 provides the annual
discounts estimated separately before and after the reform (all other covariates are
as in the baseline regressions reported in Table 3 and results for the other covari-
ates are available upon request). The level effect of the after reform dummy now
shows a particularly strong negative reform effect on rents for new leases of about
ten log points on average. The effect is significantly larger in absolute value at the
top compared to the bottom of the distribution. Before the reform, during the first
three years of a tenancy, the annual discount is 2.5 log points at the 83% quantile,
being 1.2 log points (significantly) larger than at the 17% quantile. From the fourth
year onwards, the annual discount is more uniform and lies between 0.8 and 0.9 log
points. After the reform, the annual discount becomes insignificant and the point
estimates are mostly positive. The difference (after minus before) is significantly
positive and the reduction in the discount is higher at the bottom compared to the
top of the distribution. Basically, after the reform there is no residency discount
any more. In addition to the changes in the coefficients, we also calculate the APE
of the reform effect during the two tenure intervals which table 4 reports as ’After
Reform (APE)’.23 We find a significantly negative average reform effect during the
first three years of a tenancy which increases along the distribution. However, there
is no significant average reform effect after the third year of a tenancy. Our overall
findings may be related to the fact that in general real rents are falling after the
reform and CPI inflation is generally low. Somewhat in contrast to our prior expec-
tation, the rent gap between new leases and sitting tenants does not increase after
the reform. The reform effect on new leases is particularly strong and rent increases
fall in general after the reform, which eliminates the length of residency discount
because nominal rents are unlikely to fall. These are surprising findings because the
reform attempted to curtail rent increase for sitting tenants and it did not change
regulations of the rents for new leases.
23The APEs add the level effect of the reform dummy and the effect on the cumulative discount.
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— Insert table 4 here. —
5.3 Tenancy Fixed Effects
To examine the sensitivity of our results to potential unobserved confounders that
are constant within tenancies, we reestimate the model in Table 4 also accounting
for tenancy fixed effects. To do so, we first exclude 5,870 tenancies with only one
observation and estimate the tenancy fixed effects regression based on this restricted
sample. Table 5 provides the fixed effects estimates for the residency discount before
and after the reform. Note that we can not estimate the level effect of the reform,
when accounting for tenancy fixed effects when accounting for tenancy fixed effects.
The estimated annual discounts differ from the results reported in Table 4. They
are reduced before the reform and they even become significantly positive after the
reform. Before the reform, the annual discount during the first three years of tenure
is only 0.4 log points for OLS, 0.2 log points at the 17% quantile, and 0.6 log points
at the 83% quantile. However, before the reform for elapsed tenure above three years
and after the reform the discount turns significantly positive for OLS for all levels of
elapsed tenure as well as for the median and the upper part of the distribution after
three years of elapsed tenure. These changes between the estimates in Tables 4 and
5 are compatible with sorting effects such that high price tenancies are more likely
to end early, thus enhancing the ’observed’ discount as reported in Table 4. The
finding is consistent with tenants in high-price rental units searching more strongly
for cheaper alternatives, partly because rents in these tenancies are being increased
over time. In contrast, tenancies with a low rent tend to last longer. These findings
are not consistent with the hypothesis that tenants in the low-price segment are more
likely to experience economic evictions or to search for better quality alternatives.
After the reform, landlords seem to increase rents within a tenancy in a low-inflation
environment, which is still consistent with the allowed maximum rent increases for
sitting tenants and which may be a compensation for the drop in rents for new
leases. Landlords may be using their market power arising from the cost of moving
to a new apartment. Considering the differences in the residency discount induced
by the reform, we find a similar direction of the effects in Tables 4 and 5, but the
size of the estimated changes is reduced when accounting for fixed effects.
— Insert table 5 here. —
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Summing up, controlling for tenancy fixed effects changes the estimates for the resi-
dency discounts, effectively revealing that the discount is smaller before the reform,
and we even find significantly positive tenure effects on rents after the reform. The
evidence is consistent with expensive tenancies being likely to end earlier and new
leases benefitting strongly from a reduction in rents induced by the reform. It is a
robust finding that the reform reduces the residency discount and that there is no
evidence for a residency discount after the reform.
6 Conclusions
The large private rental housing market in Germany shows a higher level of regu-
lation through rent control and tenant protection against eviction than the OECD
average. In contrast to the current situation, Germany was characterized by fairly
liberal rent laws until the 1990s. In the wake of housing shortages and strong rent
increases in the 1990s, there was a change towards more regulation in order to pro-
tect sitting tenants. For instance, the German government passed the Tenancy Law
Reform Act in 2001 to restrict rent increases and to strengthen the protection of
tenants against eviction. Based on linked housing-tenant data from the Socioeco-
nomic Panel, this paper estimates panel OLS and quantile regressions of rents within
tenancies during the time period 1984 to 2011. Specifically, we analyze the impact
of the Tenancy Law Reform Act implemented in 2001 (the reform) on the level of
rents and on the residency discount.
Our findings can be summarized as follows. Rents deflated by the CPI increase
strongly from 1984 until the reform in 2001, and there is a reversal in the trend
afterwards. Households whose tenancy started after the reform rather live in newer,
better equipped, and larger rental units. Both the level of rents and the rent-to-
income ratio grow after the reform. This suggests that demand for better equipped
housing increases over time.
Before the reform, we find a significant residence discount in the rent level which
decreases in absolute value with tenure and which is stronger at the top than at the
bottom of the rent distribution. The reform reduces rents, in particular for expensive
apartments and for new leases. The reform eliminates the residency discount and the
fixed effects estimates reveal that after the reform rents in fact grow with tenure,
especially for more expensive apartments. These are surprising findings because
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the reform attempted to curtail rent increase for sitting tenants and it did not
change regulations of the rents for new leases. The evidence is consistent with
expensive tenancies being likely to end earlier and tenants in new leases benefitting
strongly from a reduction in rents induced by the reform. After the reform, in a
low-inflation environment, landlords seem to increase rents within a tenancy which
is still consistent with the allowed maximum rent increases for sitting tenants and
which may be a compensation for the drop in rents for new leases. Landlords may
be using their market power arising from the cost of moving to a new apartment.
Altogether, households living in expensive apartments tend to benefit more from the
reform than households living in cheaper apartments.
Our evidence suggests that the reform was successful in curtailing rent increases
for new leases and for expensive apartments early in a tenancy. It remains an
open question as to whether this led to fewer houses being built, which may imply
detrimental long-run effects for renters.
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Figures
Figure 1: Rent control in the private rental market,1 2009
Scale 0-6: Increasing in degree of control
Figure 2: Tenant-landlord regulations in the private rental market,2 2009
Scale 0-6: Increasing in protection for tenants
1. This indicator is a composite indicator of the extent of controls of rents, how increases in
rents are determined and the permitted cost pass-through onto rents in each country. Control
of rent levels includes information on whether rent levels can be freely negotiated between
the landlord and the tenant, coverage of controls on rent levels and the criteria for setting
rent levels (market based, utility/cost based, negotiation based or income based). Controls
of rent increases includes information on whether rent increases can be freely agreed by the
landlord/tenant, whether rent increases are regularly indexed to some cost/price index or if
increases are capped or determined through some other administrative procedure, including
negotiation between tenant/landlord associations. The pass-through of costs onto rents
includes information on whether landlords are allowed to pass on increases in costs onto
rents (cost pass-through) and the extent of such pass-through i.e. the types of cost that can
be passed on.
2. The indicator measures the extent of tenant-landlord regulation within a tenancy. It includes
the ease of evicting a tenant, degree of tenure security and deposit requirements.
Source: Johansson (2011)
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Figure 3: Annual Residency Discount - Coefficient Estimate by Quantile
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Note: Quantile regression estimates for baseline model 1 as specified in Table 3.
Figure 4: After Reform - Coefficient Estimate by Quantile
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Note: Quantile regression estimates for baseline model 1 as specified in Table 3.
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Tables
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics (Means and Standard Deviations/Standard Errors)
Variable Full Before Reform After Reform Difference
Rent (Deflated to 2005 e) 429.786 419.522 460.864 41.342∗∗∗
(208.231) (201.072) (225.720) (1.902)
Apartment Size (in m2) 72.530 71.933 74.338 2.404∗∗∗
(26.613) (26.220) (27.690) (0.244)
Elapsed Tenure (in years) 3.802 4.165 2.705 −1.460∗∗∗
(2.790) (2.903) (2.060) (0.025)
Private Landlord 0.789 0.789 0.789 0.000
(0.408) (0.408) (0.408) (0.004)
Subsidized Housing 0.110 0.131 0.047 −0.084∗∗∗
(0.313) (0.338) (0.211) (0.003)
Year of Construction
Before 1918 0.104 0.106 0.096 −0.011∗∗∗
(0.305) (0.308) (0.294) (0.003)
1918 to 1948 0.165 0.168 0.154 −0.014∗∗∗
(0.371) (0.374) (0.361) (0.004)
1949 to 1971 0.372 0.380 0.345 −0.035∗∗∗
(0.483) (0.485) (0.475) (0.005)
1972 to 1980 0.198 0.209 0.164 −0.044∗∗∗
(0.399) (0.406) (0.370) (0.004)
1981 to 1990 0.069 0.066 0.078 0.012∗∗∗
(0.253) (0.248) (0.268) (0.002)
Since 1991 0.093 0.071 0.163 0.092∗∗∗
(0.290) (0.257) (0.370) (0.003)
City Size (Number of Inhabitants, k =ˆ 1000 inhabitants)
≥ 500k (Center) 0.372 0.382 0.342 −0.041∗∗∗
(0.483) (0.486) (0.474) (0.004)
≥ 500k (Suburb) 0.102 0.111 0.076 −0.034∗∗∗
(0.303) (0.314) (0.266) (0.003)
100k to 500k (Center) 0.153 0.134 0.211 0.077∗∗∗
(0.360) (0.341) (0.408) (0.003)
100k to 500k (Suburb) 0.070 0.056 0.113 0.057∗∗∗
(0.255) (0.229) (0.317) (0.002)
50k to 100k (Center) 0.030 0.032 0.025 −0.007∗∗∗
(0.171) (0.176) (0.155) (0.002)
50k to 100k (Suburb) 0.026 0.019 0.048 0.028∗∗∗
(0.161) (0.138) (0.213) (0.001)
20k to 50k 0.083 0.081 0.089 0.008∗∗∗
(0.276) (0.273) (0.284) (0.003)
5k to 20k 0.105 0.117 0.067 −0.050∗∗∗
(0.306) (0.321) (0.250) (0.003)
<continued on next page>
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics <continued>
Variable Full Before Reform After Reform Difference
< 5k 0.058 0.068 0.029 −0.039∗∗∗
(0.235) (0.252) (0.169) (0.002)
Equipment
Central Heating 0.924 0.912 0.963 0.051∗∗∗
(0.264) (0.284) (0.190) (0.002)
Balcony or Terrace 0.675 0.659 0.725 0.066∗∗∗
(0.468) (0.474) (0.446) (0.004)
Basement 0.919 0.919 0.919 0.000
(0.272) (0.272) (0.273) (0.003)
Garden 0.343 0.338 0.360 0.022∗∗∗
(0.475) (0.473) (0.480) (0.004)
Further Characteristics
Rent-to-Income Ratio 0.270 0.263 0.290 0.027∗∗∗
(0.171) (0.176) (0.155) (0.002)
Apt. Size per 43.321 42.450 45.957 3.508∗∗∗
Person (sqm/person) (21.242) (21.077) (21.520) (0.194)
Rent Inexpensive 0.336 0.351 0.287 −0.065∗∗∗
(Assessment) (0.472) (0.477) (0.452) (0.005)
Rent Reasonable 0.445 0.432 0.490 0.058∗∗∗
(Assessment) (0.497) (0.495) (0.500) (0.005)
Rent Expensive 0.218 0.217 0.224 0.007
(Assessment) (0.413) (0.412) (0.417) (0.004)
Apt. Size Too Small 0.246 0.250 0.233 −0.018∗∗∗
(Assessment) (0.431) (0.433) (0.423) (0.004)
Apt. Size Appropriate 0.700 0.697 0.707 0.010∗∗
(Assessment) (0.458) (0.459) (0.455) (0.004)
Apt. Size Too Large 0.055 0.053 0.060 0.008∗∗∗
(Assessment) (0.227) (0.223) (0.238) (0.002)
Apt. Condition Good 0.626 0.622 0.637 0.015∗∗∗
(Assessment) (0.484) (0.485) (0.481) (0.004)
Share of Observations 100% 75.2% 24.8% −
Note: The samples are restricted to observations with elapsed tenure up to 10 years. Cal-
culations use the SOEP sample weights. The table reports means (and standard devia-
tions/standard errors in parentheses). The column labeled ”Full” refers to the full sample.
The columns labeled ”Before Reform” and ”After Reform” refer to the subsamples with tenan-
cies starting before and after September 1, 2001, respectively. The column labeled ”Difference”
reports the mean difference between the two subsamples and its standard error. ”Apt.” de-
notes apartment, ”Bldg.” building, *,** and *** significance at the 10%-, 5%- and 1%-level,
respectively. For sets of dummy variables the reference category is printed in bold. Variables
reported under ”Further Characteristics” are not used for the final regressions. Source: SOEP
V28.1 and authors’ calculations.
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Table 2: Further Descriptive Statistics: Means by Tertiles of Rents
Variable Overall 1st Tertile 3rd Tertile Difference
Rent (Deflated to 2005 e) 429.786 245.422 651.916 406.494∗∗∗
(208.231) (54.982) (201.564) (1.433)
Apartment Size (in m2) 72.530 56.760 90.568 33.808∗∗∗
(26.613) (21.142) (26.249) (0.231)
Elapsed Tenure (in years) 3.802 3.967 3.561 −0.405∗∗∗
(2.790) (2.843) (2.693) (0.027)
Private Landlord 0.789 0.707 0.873 0.165∗∗∗
(0.408) (0.455) (0.333) (0.005)
Subsidized Housing 0.110 0.164 0.054 −0.111∗∗∗
(0.313) (0.371) (0.225) (0.003)
Tenancy Starting 0.248 0.198 0.283 0.085∗∗∗
After Reform (0.432) (0.398) (0.450) (0.004)
Equipment
Central Heating 0.924 0.843 0.978 0.135∗∗∗
(0.264) (0.364) (0.147) (0.003)
Balcony or Terrace 0.675 0.488 0.840 0.352∗∗∗
(0.468) (0.500) (0.367) (0.004)
Basement 0.919 0.876 0.957 0.082∗∗∗
(0.272) (0.330) (0.202) (0.003)
Garden 0.343 0.302 0.409 0.107∗∗∗
(0.475) (0.459) (0.492) (0.005)
Further Characteristics
Rent-to-Income Ratio 0.270 0.233 0.304 0.071∗∗∗
(0.171) (0.160) (0.201) (0.002)
Apt. Size per 43.321 41.919 44.874 2.955∗∗∗
Person (sqm/person) (21.242) (19.584) (23.328) (0.209)
Rent Inexpensive 0.336 0.477 0.200 −0.276∗∗∗
(Assessment) (0.472) (0.499) (0.400) (0.005)
Rent Reasonable 0.445 0.385 0.489 0.104∗∗∗
(Assessment) (0.497) (0.487) (0.500) (0.005)
Rent Expensive 0.218 0.139 0.311 0.172∗∗∗
(Assessment) (0.413) (0.346) (0.463) (0.004)
Apt. Size: Too Small 0.246 0.294 0.202 −0.091∗∗∗
(Assessment) (0.431) (0.455) (0.402) (0.004)
Apt. Size: Appropriate 0.700 0.679 0.710 0.032∗∗∗
(Assessment) (0.458) (0.467) (0.454) (0.004)
Apt. Size: Too Large 0.055 0.028 0.087 0.059∗∗∗
(Assessment) (0.227) (0.165) (0.282) (0.002)
Good Apt. Condition 0.626 0.555 0.691 0.136∗∗∗
(Assessment) (0.484) (0.497) (0.462) (0.005)
Note: The samples are restricted to observations with elapsed tenure up to 10 years. Calcu-
lations use the SOEP sample weights. The table reports the overall mean, the mean in the
first tertile (one third quantile), the mean in the third tertile (two third quantile) of the un-
conditional rent distribution, and the difference between the tertile-specific means. See Table
1 for further details.
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Table 3: Baseline Rent Regressions
Variable QR 17% QR 50% QR 83% 83% - 17% OLS
Annual Residency Discount
0 ≤ Elapsed Tenure ≤ 3 −0.007∗ −0.014∗∗∗−0.017∗∗∗ −0.010∗∗ −0.012∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002)
4 ≤ Elapsed Tenure ≤ 10 −0.008∗∗∗−0.009∗∗∗−0.009∗∗∗ −0.001 −0.009∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Reform Effect
After Reform −0.020 −0.029∗∗ −0.049∗∗∗ −0.029 −0.041∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.012) (0.014) (0.020) (0.012)
Apartment Size
Ln(Size) 0.498∗∗∗ 0.570∗∗∗ 0.558∗∗∗ 0.060 0.509∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.025) (0.027) (0.050) (0.028)
Ln(Size) × Balcony 0.098∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 0.007 0.119∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.020) (0.020) (0.028) (0.018)
Ln(Size) × Basement 0.198∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗ 0.172∗∗∗ −0.026 0.175∗∗∗
(0.049) (0.029) (0.029) (0.051) (0.028)
Ln(Size) (APE) 0.741∗∗∗ 0.775∗∗∗ 0.782∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗ 0.745∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.011) (0.012) (0.018) (0.011)
City Size by Population (Ref.cat: < 5k)
≥ 500k (Center) 0.258∗∗∗ 0.262∗∗∗ 0.271∗∗∗ 0.013 0.263∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.018) (0.018) (0.026) (0.017)
≥ 500k (Suburb) 0.208∗∗∗ 0.202∗∗∗ 0.198∗∗∗ −0.010 0.200∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.018) (0.020) (0.026) (0.018)
100k to 500k (Center) 0.155∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗ −0.041 0.127∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.018) (0.019) (0.026) (0.017)
100k to 500k (Suburb) 0.108∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗ −0.059∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.018) (0.020) (0.026) (0.017)
50k to 100k (Center) 0.123∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗ −0.010 0.085∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.023) (0.023) (0.033) (0.022)
50k to 100k (Suburb) 0.059∗ 0.066∗∗∗ 0.038∗ −0.021 0.060∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.023) (0.022) (0.036) (0.021)
20k to 50k 0.081∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗ 0.032 −0.049∗ 0.050∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.019) (0.021) (0.028) (0.019)
5k to 20k 0.027 0.010 0.002 −0.025 0.011
(0.025) (0.019) (0.021) (0.028) (0.018)
Missing Dummy 0.287 0.275 0.142 −0.144 0.188
(0.477) (0.171) (0.154) (0.497) (0.175)
Type of House (Ref.cat.: Detached House, 1-2 Family)
Other Bldg. −0.039 −0.002 0.021 0.060 0.000
(0.061) (0.039) (0.033) (0.062) (0.031)
Nondetached House (1-2 Family) 0.077∗∗∗ 0.092∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗ 0.017 0.088∗∗∗
<continued on next page>
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Table 3: Baseline Rent Regressions <continued>
Variable QR 17% QR 50% QR 83% 83% - 17% OLS
(0.026) (0.016) (0.016) (0.026) (0.015)
Apt. in 3-4 Unit Bldg. 0.097∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ −0.062∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.013) (0.012) (0.018) (0.011)
Apt. in 5-8 Unit Bldg. 0.125∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗ −0.060∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.012) (0.013) (0.020) (0.012)
Apt. in 9+ Unit Bldg. 0.140∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗ −0.043∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.013) (0.014) (0.022) (0.013)
High-Rise Apt. Bldg. 0.131∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗ −0.034 0.122∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.024) (0.027) (0.038) (0.025)
Missing Dummy 0.018 0.026 0.080∗∗ 0.063 0.046
(0.049) (0.033) (0.034) (0.055) (0.030)
Further Characteristics
Private Landlord 0.059∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.008) (0.009) (0.012) (0.008)
Private Landlord, Missing 0.074∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗ 0.007 0.070∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.012) (0.015) (0.021) (0.012)
Subsidized Housing −0.097∗∗∗−0.131∗∗∗−0.159∗∗∗ −0.062∗∗∗−0.132∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.009) (0.010) (0.013) (0.008)
Subsidized Housing, Missing 0.008 0.018 0.020 0.012 0.009
(0.044) (0.024) (0.030) (0.046) (0.025)
Selected Year Dummies (Ref.cat.: 1984)
2001 0.256∗∗∗ 0.225∗∗∗ 0.191∗∗∗ −0.065∗∗ 0.221∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.015) (0.021) (0.029) (0.014)
2011 0.198∗∗∗ 0.169∗∗∗ 0.171∗∗∗ −0.027 0.179∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.020) (0.025) (0.033) (0.018)
Year Dummies 1985-2011 x x x x
Year of Construction x x x x
State x x x x
Equipment x x x x
Residential Area x x x x
Amenities x x x x
Note: QR 17%, 50%, 83% denote quantile regressions at the three quantiles. 83% - 17% denotes
the difference between the two quantiles 83% and 17%. Ref.cat. denotes the reference category.
Calculations use the SOEP sample weights. Standard errors are in parentheses estimated by
bootstrap with 200 replications, clustered at tenancy level. *,** and *** denote significance at the
10%-, 5%- and 1%-level, respectively. Average partial effects (APE) are partial effects at the mean
of the covariates used for the interactions. Source: SOEP V28.1 and authors’ calculations.
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Table 4: Annual Residency Discount Before and After Reform
QR 17% QR 50% QR 83% 83% - 17% OLS
After Reform Effect
After Reform −0.065∗∗∗−0.071∗∗∗−0.109∗∗∗ −0.044∗ −0.096∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.014) (0.016) (0.024) (0.014)
After Reform (APE) −0.035∗∗ −0.043∗∗∗−0.066∗∗∗ −0.030 −0.058∗∗∗
(0 ≤ Elapsed Tenure ≤ 3) (0.018) (0.011) (0.014) (0.020) (0.012)
After Reform (APE) 0.032 0.006 0.001 −0.031 0.013
(4 ≤ Elapsed Tenure ≤ 10) (0.020) (0.015) (0.022) (0.026) (0.016)
Annual Residency Discount
(a) Before Reform
0 ≤ Elapsed Tenure ≤ 3 −0.014∗∗∗−0.020∗∗∗−0.025∗∗∗ −0.012∗∗ −0.021∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003)
4 ≤ Elapsed Tenure ≤ 10 −0.008∗∗∗−0.009∗∗∗−0.009∗∗∗ −0.001 −0.009∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001)
(b) After Reform
0 ≤ Elapsed Tenure ≤ 3 0.004 −0.003 0.001 −0.003 0.003
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.004)
4 ≤ Elapsed Tenure ≤ 10 0.005 −0.002 0.000 −0.005 0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004)
(c) Difference (After minus Before)
0 ≤ Elapsed Tenure ≤ 3 0.018∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.009 0.023∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.005)
4 ≤ Elapsed Tenure ≤ 10 0.013∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗ 0.009∗ −0.004 0.012∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004)
Note: Pooled panel OLS and quantile regressions. Calculations use the SOEP sample
weights. Standard errors are in parentheses and bootstrapped with 200 replications,
clustered at tenancy level. *,** and *** denote significance at the 10%-, 5%- and 1%-
level, respectively. Panel (a) shows annual discounts for tenancies where the old legal
situation apply while panel (b) provides information on annual discounts for tenancies
affected by the reform in 2001. Panel (c) shows the difference. Source: SOEP V28.1 and
authors’ calculations.
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Table 5: Annual Residency Discount Before and After Reform (Tenancy Fixed Ef-
fects)
QR 17% QR 50% QR 83% 83% - 17% OLS
Annual Residency Discount
(a) Before Reform
0 ≤ Elapsed Tenure ≤ 3 −0.002 −0.006∗∗∗−0.006∗∗∗ −0.004∗ −0.004∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
4 ≤ Elapsed Tenure ≤ 10 0.001 0.003∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
(b) After Reform
0 ≤ Elapsed Tenure ≤ 3 0.006 0.003 0.004 −0.003 0.007∗∗
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
4 ≤ Elapsed Tenure ≤ 10 0.005 0.008∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.005 0.007∗∗
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
(c) Difference (After minus Before)
0 ≤ Elapsed Tenure ≤ 3 0.008∗ 0.009∗∗ 0.010∗∗ 0.001 0.011∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
4 ≤ Elapsed Tenure ≤ 10 0.004 0.005∗ 0.004 0.000 0.003
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Note: Panel OLS and quantile regressions. The estimates account for tenancy mean fixed
effects. Calculations use the SOEP sample weights. Standard errors are in parentheses
and bootstrapped with 200 replications, clustered at tenancy level. *,** and *** denote
significance at the 10%-, 5%- and 1%-level, respectively. Panel (a) shows annual discounts
for tenancies where the old legal situation apply while panel (b) provides information
on annual discounts for tenancies affected by the reform in 2001. Panel (c) shows the
difference. Source: SOEP V28.1 and authors’ calculations.
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